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Abstract  
The aim of this paper is to provide an estimation and decomposition of the motherhood 
wage penalty in Colombia. Our empirical strategy is based on the matching procedure 
designed by Ñopo (2008) for the case of gender wage gaps. This is an alternative 
procedure to the well-known Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method. The cross-section 
data of the Colombian Living Standard Survey allows us to decompose the wage gap in 
four components, according to the characteristics of mothers and non-mothers. We found 
that mothers earn, in average, 1:73% less than their counterparts without children and that 
this gap slightly decreases as the group includes older women. Taking into account that 
this procedure is sensitive to the set of variables included in the matching, several 
specifications are tested. The main result of the paper is obtained when considering 
schooling as a matching variable. Once schooling is included, the unexplained part of the 
gap considerably decreases and turns non significant. Thus, we do not find evidence of 
wage discrimination against mothers in Colombia. 
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One of the most important choices faced by individuals is whether to have a
family or not. This choice implies to take into account several aspects such as
future investments in human capital, the entry and exit of parents from the
labor market, changes in consumption patterns, among others. In a traditional
couple, getting married and having children do not have the same e⁄ect for
women than for men. Nowadays, and during most of the last century, women are
occupied in some other issues besides marrying and childbearing. They usually
combine family life with professional life, as men have always done. This new
role for women may imply a trade-o⁄ between human capital investments and
the number of children. It may also imply a trade-o⁄ between cumulative labor
experience and the number of children.
There is evidence in the literature showing that certain family decisions
may a⁄ect labor market outcomes of women - wages and working time - more
than those outcomes of men (See for instance Lundberg and Rose (2002)).
Although work and family responsibilities can be done simultaneously, the fact
is that, on average, mothers spend more time with their children than fathers do.
Women, after childbearing, usually stay longer out of the job market compared
to men, which may a⁄ect their cumulative experience, job training and wages.
In fact, childbearing may cause that mothers have to seek for another job more
￿ exible in time, which gives them a penalty in their experience and salary.
In the literature, there is a variety of explanations for the existence of this
gap. These explanations range from the existence of unobserved heterogeneity,
discrimination, and institutional features, to intermittences in jobs and less
continuos labor tenure (see Waldfogel (1997), Anderson et al. (2003) and
Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel (2008)).
Additionally, there are empirical studies comparing labor participation and
wages of mothers and non-mothers. Their main interest is to ￿nd out if there
is a "family gap" between these two groups of women (Angrist and Evans
(1998), Cruces and Galiani (2007), Peæa and Olarte (2011), Budin and
England (2001) among others). Most of the studies ￿nd, after controlling by
socioeconomic characteristics of women, that there is a statistically signi￿cant
gap in favor of non-mothers. However, in the opposite side, others as Piras
and Ripani (2005) provide no conclusive evidence for di⁄erent countries in
Latin-America.
The purpose of this paper is to provide new evidence about the existence of
gaps in wages between women with and women without children for the case
of Colombia. To the best of our knowledge, this is an aspect that has only
been studied by means of Mincerian equations without recognizing the exis-
tence of particular di⁄erences between the individuals in their characteristics￿
distribution. In this sense, the contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we
use a non -parametric approach which allows us to have an accurate idea of
the actual di⁄erences between mothers and no-mothers in their labor earnings.
This approach, designed by ￿opo (2008) for the study of gender wage gaps,
has the advantage of providing a gap￿ s decomposition according to the set of
2common characteristics that are included in a matching procedure. Second,
given that there is mixed evidence about the existence of penalty or premium of
motherhood in the literature for di⁄erent countries, we want to contribute with
additional evidence for a developing country such as Colombia. As Waldfogel
(1997) states, while the gender wage gap has fallen in recent years, the moth-
erhood wage gap has actually increased. Thus, it is interesting to deepen in the
origin of this wage penalty, which is done here using the ￿opo￿ s decomposition
method.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 brie￿ y summarizes some
of the previous contributions to study the e⁄ect of childbearing on the labor
market participation and female wages. Section 3 describes the empirical strat-
egy adopted in the paper, which is based on the previous work by ￿opo (2008).
Section 4 shows some descriptive analysis using data from the Colombian Living
Standard Survey from 2008, carried out by the National Department of Statis-
tics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica, DANE). Section 5
presents the results of our estimations and, ￿nally, section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Since the paper from Hill (1979), there have been numerous contributions deal-
ing with empirical evidence of children penalty in labor markets (lower wages)
for mothers. The factors behind this so-called family gap could be di⁄erent from
those which are behind gender gaps. Therefore, it is interesting to study this is-
sue in depth, also because there is much less evidence in the case of motherhood
gaps than in the case of gender gaps. We start by reviewing papers that ana-
lyze labor-market penalties of motherhood using data from developed countries.
Afterwards, we include papers showing empirical evidence for Latin-American
countries. For Colombia, to the best of our knowledge, there is only one more
paper by Peæa and Olarte (2011) dealing with the topic. They work with
the same database that we do, however, they use a di⁄erent methodology of
estimation, decomposition and analysis of the gap. The paper is reviewed at
the end of this section.
The relationship between fertility and labor participation has received noto-
rious attention because of its implications on several dimensions of human life.
However, there is a complex link between them in empirical exercises. The exis-
tence of endogeneity is one of the reasons that have justi￿ed so many changes in
methodological approaches followed in this ￿eld. Angrist and Evans (1998)
propose a set of instruments to deal with the endogeneity of fertility when mod-
elling the e⁄ect of childbearing on parents labor supply. Those instruments are
related to the parents￿preference for mixed-sex children. Speci￿cally, having
two children of the same sex increases the probability of bearing a third child.
In addition, the authors explore using twin births as an instrument. They em-
ploy US census databases from 1970, 1980 and 1990. The sample is restricted
to mothers from 21 to 35 years old, whose oldest child is less than 18. The
instrumented fertility variable is "more than two children".
3Their results show that women with two children of the same sex or whose
second birth were twins have lower probability of working, work fewer hours, and
have lower earnings and family income. Having more than two children reduces
labor supply by 6:4 weeks a year, 5:2 weekly hours worked, and slightly reduces
wages. In contrast to previous evidence, according to which labor supply e⁄ects
are larger for high educated women, Angrist and Evans (1998) ￿nd that
childbearing has a higher e⁄ect on the labor outcomes of low educated women,
as well as poor women. The authors conclude that ￿even though childbearing
clearly a⁄ects labor supply, the increase in female labor-force participation has
been so large that declining fertility can explain only a small fraction of the
overall change￿(page 474).
Other studies have exclusively focused on the wage di⁄erences between moth-
ers and non-mothers. Budin and England (2001) analyze motherhood
wage penalty by using ￿xed-e⁄ects models. The data corresponds to the US
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1982-1993). Their results show a 7%
wage penalty per child, being larger for married women than for unmarried
women. Given the lower job experience of women with more children, the au-
thors control for this factor and obtain a signi￿cant 5% wage penalty per child.
The penalty is partially explained because mothers have a higher probability of
working part-time. However, there is still an unexplained part of wage penalty
which, according to the authors, might probably be due to a possible negative
impact of childbearing on productivity and discrimination against women with
children.
Anderson et al. (2003) use the US National Longitudinal Survey of Young
women (1968-1988) to examine the wage penalty of mothers compared to non-
mothers, ￿nding that human capital characteristics and unobserved heterogene-
ity explain 55%-57% of the gap. The authors are interested in exploring di⁄er-
ences in the wage gap among mothers with di⁄erent skill levels. They ￿nd that
medium-skilled mothers (high school graduates) experience longer and higher
wage losses from motherhood than both low-skilled and high-skilled mothers.
According to the authors, time constraints are the explanation of the existence
of this higher gap, since high school graduates women most probably will get
a job with no time ￿ exibility, this is, with compulsory presence during o¢ ce
hours. If this is true, medium-skilled mothers would be more willing to accept
lower wages in order to gain some ￿ exibility. They also ￿nd that the highest
wage gap exists when women ￿rst return to work. The penalty reduces as time
passes, at a slower pace in the case of medium-skilled mothers.
For seven industrialized countries (Germany, Australia, Canada, Finland,
USA, the UK and Sweden), Harkness and Waldfogel (2003) analyze the
e⁄ect of marriage and the age of children on the labor supply and wages of
women. The authors found di⁄erences in the results among countries. The
e⁄ect of children on wages is higher in the UK than in the rest of countries
because women tend to participate in bad paid and part-time jobs. On the
contrary, the impact on wages of mothers from Nordic countries is the lowest.
In the empirical evidence for Latin-American countries, we have the works
of Cruces and Galiani (2007), Piras and Ripani (2005) and Peæa and Olarte
4(2011). Cruces and Galiani (2007) use the instruments proposed by Angrist
and Evans (1998) - same-sex children and twins -, in order to explore the e⁄ect
of fertility on maternal labor supply in Mexico and Argentina. The authors
restrict the sample to women between 21 and 35 with at least two children,
and an oldest child at most 18 years old, excluding those whose second child
is younger than one year. According to them, female labor supply is lower
for married women than for single (both countries). In Mexico, the average
number of children for married women (3:03) is higher than in Argentina (2:98).
In the ￿rst stage of a two-step procedure, they ￿nd that having two "same-sex"
children increases the probability of bearing more than two children, even more
in the case of two girls. Instrumental variables results show that having more
than two children reduces mothers￿labor supply by 8:1 to 9:6 percentage points
in Argentina and 6:3 to 9:6 percentage points in Mexico.
A paper ￿nding mixed evidence on children wage penalty for di⁄erent Latin-
American countries is the one by Piras and Ripani (2005). They calculate
the cost of motherhood in terms of salaries and labor supply for Bolivia, Brazil,
Ecuador and Peru. The authors were motivated by the evidence from previous
studies: while the gender wage gap has been narrowing, the gap between mothers
and non-mothers is increasing. Besides, men do not seem to su⁄er children
penalty. The authors restrict the sample to women from urban areas between
14 and 45 years old who are not self-employed.
They ￿nd that young mothers (14 to 25 years) participate more in the labor
market than young non-mothers, which is expected because of the need of the
￿rst group to ￿nance the children. The opposite is true for older cohorts. Be-
sides, dividing the sample into married and unmarried, mothers of the second
group work more than unmarried mothers: "female participation rates increases
with age and decreases with family responsibilities". The evidence of the exis-
tence of wage premium or penalty for motherhood is di⁄erent among countries.
For Bolivia, results reveal a wage premium for having children from 13 to 18
years old. For Brazil, the premium is for having children younger than seven
years. On the contrary, results from Peru reveal the existence of a penalty of
motherhood and those from Ecuador were not signi￿cant. The authors do not
correct by selection bias.
Finally, Peæa and Olarte (2011) analyze the impact of children on women
wages using the Colombian Living Standard Survey of 2008. They seek to
explore, as we do, the existence of a ￿ family gap￿or wage penalty for maternity
in Colombia. The authors use cross-section analysis correcting by selection
bias, and restrict the sample to women between 18 and 65 years, living in urban
areas and reporting a wage higher than one dollar per day. From the data, they
observe that there is self-selection in the entrance of women to the labor market:
female workers are younger, have fewer children in average, have lower non-wage
income, and are more educated. Among those female workers, mothers are older,
less educated, obtain less wage per hour, live more often in couples, are more
often the head of the household, and have more responsibilities in the house
than non-mothers.
After correcting the selection bias and controlling for observable factors such
5as human capital, household structure, and region, there is still a wage di⁄er-
ential of 9:4%, which increases for women with children from 0 to 5 years old
(18:4%). Being a mother increases the probability of belonging to the health
subsidized regimen, and being engaged on low quality jobs, especially for those
with children under 5 years old.
Let us recall that there are no contributions, previous to this paper, using
the ￿opo￿ s wage gap decomposition for Colombia or any other country, for the
case of motherhood penalty.
3 Methodology
Most of the papers analyzing wage gaps (gender and family gaps), use Mincerian
equations and the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to detect and explore further
both gender and family wage gap. Those studies focused on di⁄erences in labor
supply between mothers and non-mothers use instrumental variables to regress
worked hours on endogenous fertility variables (As it is done in Angrist and
Evans (1998) and Cruces and Galiani(2005)). This paper will use the method-
ology proposed by ￿opo (2008), which he and others have previously used to
explore gender wage gaps.
The main advantage of ￿opo￿ s method is that it deals with a potential
problem in the Blinder-Oaxaca approach (already recognized in the case of
gender analysis), namely, the existing di⁄erences in the support of characteristics
for mothers and non-mothers.1 For the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, the
earning equations of the two groups should be estimated. A bipartition of the
wage gap is done: one part of the gap is explained by di⁄erences in the average
characteristics of women, and the second part is due to di⁄erences in the average
rewards of these characteristics. The interesting part is the second one, which
contains the e⁄ect of unobservable di⁄erences in characteristics between mothers
and non-mothers, and potential discrimination of the labor market against (or
in favour of) mothers. If there are di⁄erences in the supports of the distributions
of characteristics for mothers and non-mothers, there will be combinations of
characteristics for which it is possible to ￿nd non-mothers in the labor supply,
but not mothers. One example is young non-mother, with university degree,
working full-time, and non-self-employed. Likewise, there will be mothers in
the labor supply who do not match in the non-mothers group. For instance,
young mother, self-employed, and par-time worker.
Adapting ￿opo (2008) to our concerns, let us have two types of women: non-
mothers (N) and mothers (M), who have certain socioeconomic characteristics
denoted by x. Equations (1) and (2) stand for the expected value of earnings
of N and M respectively,
1The support of a probability distribution is the closure of the set of possible values of










where FN and FM are the cumulative distribution functions of women￿ s
characteristics, conditional on being non-mother or mother, and SN and SM
correspond to the support of the distribution of characteristics for non-mothers
and mothers respectively. The gap is de￿ned by M= E[Y jN] ￿ E[Y jM]. Given
that SN and SM are di⁄erent, each integral of equations (1) and (2) is divided
in two parts, within the intersection (SN \SM) and out of the common support


















After some algebraic manipulation and rede￿nition of the integrals in equa-
tion (3), the gap is expressed as:2
￿ = ￿N + ￿M + ￿x + ￿0 (4)
where ￿N is the part of the gap explained by the di⁄erences in characteristics
between non-mothers out of the common support (unmatched non-mothers) and
non-mothers in the common support (matched non-mothers). It is the weighted
di⁄erence between the expected wages of non-mothers out of the common sup-















The weight, ￿N(SM), is the probability measure of the set SM under the
distribution dFN(:) of non-mothers characteristics, or the probability measure
(under the distribution of non-mothers characteristics) of the sets of character-
istics that mothers do not reach. Analogous interpretations could be done for
the case of ￿N(SM).3
The second term, ￿M, is the part of the gap that can be explained by the
di⁄erences in characteristics between matched mothers and unmatched moth-
ers. It is the weighted di⁄erence between the expected wages of mothers in
the common support minus the expected wages of mothers out of the common
support.
2See ￿opo (2008) to check the whole precedure.
3￿N(SM) =
R

















￿M(￿N) would be zero either if all mothers (non-mothers) can be matched
to non-mothers (mothers), or if all unmatched mothers (non-mothers) have sim-
ilar averages wages than the matched mothers (non-mothers).
The term ￿xis the portion which can be explained by di⁄erences in the dis-













Finally, ￿0 is the unexplained part of the wage gap, this is, the part not due to
di⁄erences in characteristics of women. If there exists discrimination between
mothers and non-mothers, ￿0 would capture this issue, as well as the existence
of unobserved characteristics penalized or rewarded by the labor market. How-
ever, this method does not allows us to di⁄erentiate which proportion of the








The matching procedure summarized by ￿opo (2008) is a ￿ve-step algorithm.
The ￿rst step consists of selecting one mother (with no replacement) from the
sample. The second step, select all non-mothers having the same characteristics
of the mother selected in step one. The third is to construct a synthetic non-
mother with all women selected in step 2, with a wage equal to the average
wage of the selected non-mothers. This allows us to match the synthetic non-
mother to the original mother. The fourth step is to put the observations of the
synthetic non-mother and the mother in their new samples of matched women.
Finally, we repeat the fourth step until the whole original mothers sample is
exhausted.4
As mentioned, ￿opo￿ s approach solves the problem of missespeci￿cation for
the di⁄erences in the supports of the distribution of women￿ s characteristics. To
motivate the relevance of considering this issue, the following table shows the
percentage of mothers and non-mothers out of the common support as we add
individuals￿characteristics to the matching procedure.
It is clear, from table 1, that assuming that the linear estimators of the wage
equations are also valid out of the supports of women characteristics for which
they were estimated, is actually a strong assumption. This is the problem of
the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition that the ￿opo￿ s methodology overcomes.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that we carried out the Inverse mill￿ s test to
detect selection bias. As we found evidence of selection problems, a Heckman
correction was performed.
4This procedure could be done in statistical packages such as SAS and Stata. In fact, ￿opo
provides a Stata program that allows us to do the whole matching procedure and gives the
results of M and each of its components.
8Table 1: Percentage of Mothers out of the common support
No-mothers Mothers
Age(A) + Region(R) 0:1 3:8
Age + Reg + Full time(F) 5:6 10:6
A + R + FT + Self ￿ employed(SE) 10:2 20:1
A + R + FT + SE + Couple(C) 20:5 32:0
A + R + FT + SE + C + Schooling level(SL) 35:3 42:6
A + R + SL 6:3 28:6
A + R + Sch + FT 17:9 29:8
A + R + Sch + FT + SE 26:1 36:3
Source: Results of the ￿opo￿ s matching procedure using data from the ECV
2008
4 Data and descriptive Statistics
We use the Colombian Living Standard Survey (ECV hereafter, for their Span-
ish initials), carried out by the National Department of Statistics - DANE- in
2008.5 The survey inquires about housing conditions, access and quality of
water, characteristics and composition of the household, health, characteristics
of children less than 5 years old, education (to members 5 years old or more),
employment, living conditions and household spending.
There are 8.562 women from 18 to 65 years old in the sample, for a population
size of 9.7 millions. 69% of them have had one or more children, 48:6% of
mothers have a job, about the same proportion of non-mothers, 48%. The
sample is restricted to urban areas.
Table 2: Characteristics of the sample
Observations Sample Population Size %
Mothers 6:008 6:749:086 69:4
Non-Mothers 2:644 2:970:220 30:6
Total Women 8:652 9:719:306 100:0
Source: ECV, 2008
Table 3 shows the logarithm of the average wage per hour for mothers and no
mothers. As expected, mothers earn, in average, lower wages than women with
no children. Although not reported on table 3, data reveals that the average
wage decreases as the number of children increases, from 7:97 for non-mothers,
to 7:4 for mothers with 5 children. For robustness, we show all the results for
two di⁄erent groups of age: 18-45 years and 18-65 years. The latter group
5This survey has been carried out since 1993 with other applications in 1997 and 2003.
However, previous questionaries did not include speci￿c questions about fertility that prevents
us to make comparisons in time.
9is included for comparability with the work of Peæa and Olarte (2011). The
di⁄erences among groups is very small though.
It is observed that, independently of the motherhood condition, hourly wage
is slightly higher for those women working part time than for those working
full time. In addition, the wage is higher for public employees than for private
employees, with self-employed women getting the lowest hourly wage. The same
patterns are observed for the separated samples of mothers and non-mothers.6
Comparing the wages of mothers and non-mothers, the ￿rst group has a lower
average wage for both part time and full time workers, with a more important
di⁄erence in the case of women working full-time. Likewise, self-employed and
private employees mothers get lower wages than non-mothers in the same labor
categories. This is not the case for female public employees, whose wages are
not statistically di⁄erent between mothers and non-mothers.
There are no di⁄erences in the observed patterns among di⁄erent age groups.
Table 3: Hourly wage (Log) of mothers and non-mothers
18 - 45 years 18 - 65 years
Part-time 7:96 8:03
Full time 7:94 7:96
Self Employed 7:55 7:59
Private employee 7:90 7:91
Public employee 8:68 8:80
Mothers 7:69 7:72
Part-time*** 7:91 7:98
Full time*** 7:87 7:90
Private Employee* 7:86 7:88
Public Employee 8:67 8:80
Self Employed*** 7:49 7:51
Non-Mothers 7:84 7:86
Part time*** 8:12 8:19
Full time*** 8:09 8:09
Private Employee* 7:97 7:97
Public Employee 8:71 8:80
Self Employed*** 7:84 7:85
Source: Own calculations based on ECV, 2008.
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 Signi￿cance of the di⁄erences in wages, for
each category of employment, between mothers and non-mothers
Table 4 contains information of the distribution of women according to di⁄er-
ent labor characteristics and schooling levels. The proportion of mothers work-
6However, the di⁄erence between the wage of mothers working full-time and those working
part-time is not statistically signi￿cant. The same in the case of the wage di⁄erence between
non-mothers working full-time and part-time.
10ing part-time is higher than the proportion of non-mothers doing so. Similarly,
the proportion of mothers working full time is lower compared to non-mothers.
it is appealing that a higher proportion of mothers work overtime compared
to non-mothers. This could be a consequence of the higher proportion of self-
employed mothers: a third part of working mothers are self-employed,compared
to only 18% in the case of non-mother workers. Another observed fact is that
mothers are more likely to work in small ￿rms than non-mothers. In addition,
a higher proportion of non-mothers work in jobs from both public and private
sector (72:9%), compared to wage-earning mothers (55:8%). This is expectable
since mothers need jobs with more ￿ exibility in order to carry out their child
caring duties.
As for education, the highest schooling level reached by women with no chil-
dren is signi￿cantly higher than the levels reached by mothers. This educational
advantage of non-mothers is even clearer for the youngest group of age. While
around 48% of mothers have carried out some superior studies (complete or
not), around 60% of non-mothers have done the same. We will see in the next
section, that education is the key factor explaining the family wage gap between
women with and without children.
Table 4: Women labor and schooling characteristics
18-45 years 18-65 years
M N M N
Labor Characteristics
Part-time 25:6 19:8 27:4 23:1
Full time 41:9 50:6 41:5 48:3
Over time 32:5 29:5 31:1 28:6
Small ￿rm 62:2 47:6 62:6 52:8
Employer 1:9 1:0 2:2 1:4
Self-employed 32:9 18:1 34:6 24:6
Private employee 48:9 64:4 44:2 53:9
Public employee 6:9 8:5 8:7 10:2
Schooling level
None 1:56 2:14 3:23 3:78
Primary 24:69 11:34 29:68 23:78
Secondary and high school 52:16 40:53 46:52 35:49
Technical 7:93 14:62 6:78 11:22
Technological 2:29 4:54 2:08 3:26
University with no Diploma 2:49 5:68 2:21 4:16
University with Diploma 7:39 15:84 7:32 13:47
Graduate with no Diploma 0:1 0:23 0:21
Graduate with Diploma 1:39 5:08 1:97 0:02
Source: Own calculations based on ECV, 2008 M: mother; N:Non-Mother
Finally, table 5 shows an interesting fact: the proportion of women work-
11ing does not di⁄er from mothers and non-mothers. The di⁄erences are deter-
mined for the schooling level and not for the motherhood condition. In fact,
the proportion of women working increases with the schooling level for both
groups.
Table 5: Labor characteristics by schooling level18-65
Total PI PC S U
Mothers
Working 52% 39% 45% 58% 82%
Not working 48% 61% 55% 42% 18%
100 100 100 100 100
No mothers
Working 52% 31% 42% 55% 79%
Not working 48% 69% 58% 45% 21%
100 100 100 100 100
Notes: PI: primary incomplete, PC: primary complete, S: secondary, U: some
superior education.
Source: Own calculations based on ECV, 2008
5 Results
The ￿opo￿ s matching wage gap decomposition method was applied to obtain
the wage di⁄erential between mothers and non-mothers. The inverse Mill￿ s ratio
revealed the existence of a selection bias, therefore, we dealt with the problem
by using the Heckman correction.7 Results show that women with no children
earn, on average, 1:73% more than mothers. The gap decreases as the age group
includes older women. Each column of table 6 corresponds to the results of the
gap decomposition with di⁄erent matching variables. We start the matching
using the age of the woman and region where she lives (column 1). The next
column incudes the previous matching variables and, in addition, "full-time" - a
variable indicating if the woman works full or partial time. Column 3 considers
the previous variables plus "self-employed", a dummy equals to 1 if the woman
works by her own. Column 4 and 5 adds "couple" - if the woman has a partner
or if she is single- and schooling level, respectively.
There is a very remarkable result which is, in our concept, the most impor-
tant result of this paper: schooling is the key variable a⁄ecting the size of the
unexplained part of the gap (￿O). We see on the ￿rst four columns that ￿O is
even higher than the total gap, except when we add schooling level as a match-
ing variable, where this part considerably decreases and becomes non signi￿cant.
To see how powerful the schooling level is in determining the result, we change
the order of adding the matching variables. Column 10 includes age, region and
7The estimations before correcting the selection bias are shown in the appendix.
12schooling level only. Columns 20 and 30 add full-time and self-employed respec-
tively. Once schooling is considered, the unexplained part of gap decreases and
turns non signi￿cant. Recalling that certain part of ￿O can be attributed to
discrimination, we could not say that there is evidence of discrimination against
mothers in Colombia. Furthermore, as ￿O decreases, ￿X increases, the part of
the gap explained by di⁄erences in the distribution of characteristics of mothers
and non-mothers.
Taking schooling into account also increases ￿N, the part of the gap exist-
ing because there are some combinations of characteristics of non-mothers that
mothers do not reach. This means that the expected wage of unmatched non-
mothers is higher than the expected wage of matched non-mothers. This seems
consistent with the di⁄erences in schooling levels between these two groups that
can be seen on ￿gure 1: while the 26% of unmatched non-mothers has some
superior studies, only 13% of matched non-mothers has this schooling level.
Besides schooling, another factor that might be driving the results is that
mothers may have lower elasticity of labor supply compared to non-mothers,
which make them willing to accept lower wages jobs, if they are more time
￿ exible. By doing so, they could spend more time with their children. In fact,
there is a high proportion of mothers working as self-employed, which usually
o⁄ers lower wages: while the average wage of self-employed female workers is
around 456 thousand of pesos, for employees is 796 thousand. This would mean
that mothers self-select in lower paid jobs.
Nonetheless, the data shows that mothers have lower levels of education
than non-mothers (see table 4), which implies that they have less probability to
engage in a well paid job compared to women without children. So, it is not only
that they may exchange ￿ exibility for better paid jobs, but also, their capacity
to aspire to high wages jobs is limited, given their lower schooling achievements.
We have tried a di⁄erent arrangement of the matching variables shown on
the third panel of table 6. It is interesting to check that the variable region plays
an important role in determining the percentage of women out of the common
support. However, the main results pointed out from the estimations of panel
1 and 2 do not change.
It is worthwhile to check the characteristics of women in the common sup-
port compared to those out of the common support, this is, women that can be
matched and those who can not (using the whole group of matching variables
listed on table 6). Figure (1) shows some characteristics for the four relevant
groups: matched mothers (M-in), unmatched mothers (M-out), matched no
mothers (N-in) and unmatched no mothers (N-out). According to the ￿rst panel,
mothers out of the common support are older than those who could be matched,
while a big proportion of unmatched no mothers belong to the youngest groups
of age. The second panel reveals that a good part of unmatched non-mothers
are high-educated, while unmatched mothers have lower education levels. This
is consistent with the results of the wage gap decompositions described before
and shown on table 5. As for the third panel, it shows that most of the matched
women (mothers or non-mothers) work full-time. Finally, although not ap-
pearing on ￿gure (1), the data suggests that the proportion of self-employed
13Table 6: Results of the matching wage gap decomposition
18 - 45 years
A& R + FT +SE +C +SL A,R & SL + FT +SE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1￿ ) (2￿ ) (3￿ )
Gap 1:73 1:73 1:73 1:73 1:73 1:73 1:73 1:73
￿O 3:98 1:76 1:82 1:75 0:69 0:04 0:45 0:59
(0:17) (0:40) (0:45) (0:71) (0:75) (0:22) (0:67) (0:72)
￿N : ￿0:07 ￿0:07 0:34 1:88 0:49 0:84 1:16
￿M 0:02 ￿0:14 ￿0:28 ￿1:09 ￿1:71 0:49 ￿0:72 ￿0:95
￿X ￿2:27 0:18 0:26 0:73 0:85 0:70 1:15 0:93
%N 100 94:28 89:60 79:00 64:25 94:77 82:94 74:80
%M 96:81 89:97 80:31 66:53 55:74 69:82 69:63 63:12
18 - 65 years
Gap 1:56 1:56 1:56 1:56 1:56 1:56 1:56 1:56
￿O 3:15 1:44 1:69 1:62 0:71 0:06 0:49 0:67
(0:15) (0:31) (0:35) (0:59) (0:61) (0:19) (0:55) (0:58)
￿N ￿0:00 ￿0:01 ￿0:01 0:43 2:01 0:58 1:08 1:35
￿M 0:02 ￿0:26 ￿0:50 ￿1:18 ￿1:86 0:09 ￿0:99 ￿1:25
￿X ￿0:05 0:38 0:38 0:69 ￿0:69 0:81 0:97 0:78
%N 99:9 94:4 89:8 79:46 64:65 93:68 82:12 73:90
%M 96:2 89:4 79:9 68:03 57:42 71:43 70:20 63:74
A& FT +SE +C +SL +R A & SL + FT +SE
￿O 2:09 1:95 1:73 0:54 0:71 0:37 0:35 0:33
(0:14) (0:14) (0:18) (0:34) (0:68) (0:15) (0:20) (0:22)
￿N : ￿0:05 ￿0:05 0:45 2:01 0:07 0:10 0:22
￿M 0:01 0:00 0:00 ￿3:52 ￿1:86 ￿0:01 0:07 0:06
￿X ￿0:54 ￿0:35 ￿0:13 0:91 0:69 1:11 1:03 0:95
%N 100 99:65 96:94 89:60 64:64 99:45 98:13 96:18
%M 99:95 99:17 94:90 78:72 57:42 99:96 95:41 89:09
Source: Own calculations based on ECV, 2008
A: Age, R: Region, FT: Full-time, SE: Self-employed, C: Couple, SL: Schooling
Level
Standard errors for ￿O in parenthesis
14Figure 1: Mothers in and out of the Common Support
workers belonging to the unmatched groups is higher than the proportion of
self-employed matched women.
Additional estimations were done using the traditional Blinder-Oaxaca de-
composition. As ￿opo (2008) points out "matching is equivalent to Blinder-
Oaxaca when the estimations of the earnings equations for males and females
are restricted to the common support and performed with the same matching
variables and all their possible powers and interactions. We should therefore
expect similar results from both" (page 297). Our results are, indeed, quite
similar to those obtained with the matching method (Table 7): the unexplained
part of the gap (coe¢ cients) declines considerably once schooling is added to
the estimation. Even more, the wage gap is no longer signi￿cant once schooling
is included.
15Table 7: Results of Blinder - Oaxaca decomposition
18-65
A& R + FT +SE +C +SL
Gap ￿0:121 ￿ ￿￿ ￿0:198 ￿ ￿￿ ￿0:204 ￿ ￿￿ ￿0:236 ￿ ￿￿ ￿0:021
% 1:61% 2:54% 2:62% 3:03% 0:26%
Endowments 0:187 ￿ ￿ 0:012 0:014 0:030 0:032
Coe¢ cients ￿0:145 ￿ ￿￿ ￿0:215 ￿ ￿￿ ￿0:224 ￿ ￿￿ ￿0:276 ￿ ￿￿ ￿0:040
Interactions ￿0:005 0:005 0:006 0:009 ￿0:013
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Source: Own calculations based on ECV, 2008
A,R, FT, SE,C and SL de￿ned as before.
6 Conclusions
The analysis of wage gaps in developing countries is an interesting issue because
of the structure of their labor markets (evidence of segmented labor market) and
the existence of high inequalities in terms of human capital and income. The
aim of this paper is to provide new evidence of the wage di⁄erences between
mothers and non-mothers for Colombia. We ￿nd that the children wage penalty
estimated by Peæa and Olarte (2011), 9:4%, is much higher than the one we
obtain (1:73%) by using the matching procedure to decompose the gap. The
explanation of such a di⁄erence is that the method we are using here considers
the di⁄erences in the supports of the distributions of characteristics for mothers
and non-mothers. Ignoring these di⁄erences - as in the Blinder-Oaxaca method
- actually leads to an overestimation of the wage gap, as the empirical evidence
suggests.
The results of the paper show that schooling is the main variable explaining
the existing wage gap between mothers and non-mothers. Once this variable
is included in the matching procedure, the unexplained part of the gap - the
one due to unobservable characteristics and potential discrimination - reduces
considerably and turns non signi￿cant. That is, there is no evidence of wage
discrimination against women with children in the Colombian labor market.
Another socioeconomic characteristic of mothers driving the results is their
higher probability of being self-employed. Mothers are more likely to work by
their own, in order to have greater time ￿ exibility. This constitutes a trade-o⁄
between higher ￿ exibility and higher wages. If mothers have lower elasticity of
labor supply compared to non-mothers, they will be willing to engage in lower
paid but more time ￿ exible jobs. Additionally, mothers have lower schooling
levels than women with no children, which limit their capacity to aspire to
higher paid jobs.
In summary, there is no evidence of the relevance of unobservable factors
(maybe discrimination) explaining the wage gap between mothers and non-
mothers. It is mainly the di⁄erences in education levels between these two
groups what explains the actual wage gap. This is not an obvious remark, since
16the existing literature, as it was pointed out in section 2, has been suggesting the
potential relevance of unexplained factors determining the earning di⁄erences
between women with and without children. What we emphasize here is that
those di⁄erences are mainly explained by observable socioeconomic characteris-
tics of women.
Our results also enrich the current discussion about labor legislation. Some
entities from the public sector in Colombia have been proposing to allow women
to re-arrange their working day - e.g. start working one hour earlier each day-, in
order to make easier for women with children to carry out their home activities.
In fact, introducing ￿ exibility would allow mothers to apply to this kind of job
positions, not being forced to accept lower salaries than men or non-mothers.
17Appendix
Table 8: Results of the matching wage gap decomposition with no
correction of the Selection bias
18 - 45 years
A& R + FT +SE +C +SL A,R & SL + FT +SE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1￿ ) (2￿ ) (3￿ )
Gap 2:57 2:57 2:57 2:57 2:57 2:57 2:57 2:57
￿O 4:13 2:90 3:36 4:28 0:28 ￿0:10 ￿0:13 0:07
￿N ￿0:13 ￿0:55 ￿0:97 ￿1:29 0:09 0:26 0:35 0:11
￿M 0:09 0:26 0:78 0:57 2:09 1:21 1:09 1:97
￿X ￿1:52 ￿0:04 ￿0:60 ￿0:98 0:08 1:20 1:25 0:41
%N 96:3 88:9 80:2 60:3 32:6 83:4 67:3 52:2
%M 93:6 80:9 62:4 36:3 16:2 57:5 42:5 30:4
18 - 65 years
Gap 2:45 2:45 2:45 2:45 2:45 2:45 2:45 2:45
￿O 3:30 2:39 3:13 4:04 0:10 ￿0:08 ￿0:24 0:19
￿N ￿0:19 ￿0:38 ￿0:86 ￿1:26 0:43 0:54 0:94 0:42
￿M 0:02 0:18 0:57 0:58 2:06 0:96 0:77 1:76
￿X ￿0:68 0:27 ￿0:39 ￿0:90 ￿0:14 1:03 0:98 0:07
%N 96:7 90:5 81:2 60:6 30:6 83:1 66:2 49:1
%M 91:6 78:2 59:1 35:4 14:5 56:3 40:1 27:2
A& FT +SE +C +SL +R A & SL + FT +SE
￿O 3:31 3:04 2:81 0:11 0:10 0:26 ￿0:14 ￿0:20
￿N : ￿0:08 ￿0:32 0:23 0:43 0:07 0:07 0:20
￿M 0:001 0:05 0:29 1:06 2:06 0:25 0:34 0:83
￿X ￿0:87 ￿0:55 ￿0:32 1:04 ￿0:14 1:18 2:17 1:62
%N 100 99:5 93:9 79:9 30:6 98:5 96:5 92:8
%M 99:9 98:4 90:1 57:1 14:5 95:6 90:6 77:5
Source: Own calculations based on ECV, 2008 A: Age, R: Region, FT: Full-
time, SE: Self-employed, C: Couple, SL: Schooling Level
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